Another option would be to argue that his statements in the Perspectiva are based on his realism about universals and his theory of so-called ‘ species’. 8 This is, however, merely speculative and calls for further explanation for why he changed his mind. While in his Metaphysics commentary, written at some point between 12, he still believed that nonhuman animals cannot engage in the cognition of universals, he substantially revised this view when writing the Perspectiva, at some point in or after 1260. The easiest way to resolve the tension between these passages would be to say that Bacon changed his mind over time. 7 Now how can this be reconciled with what he says about the cognition of universals in the Perspectiva? Consequently, nonhuman animals only have a ‘grasp of singulars not under some common nature’ ( acceptio singularium non sub aliqua natura communi acceptorum). In both commentaries, he stresses that only humans engage in what he calls ‘experimental cognition’ ( cognitio experimentalis), that is, a ‘universal grasp of singulars’ ( universalis acceptio singularium) or the ‘collation of singulars to one universal’ ( collatio singularium ad unum universale). However, this interpretation is incompatible with what Bacon says in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. For instance, a dog acquires the universal or the concept ‘man’ after having met several men. Now since the cogitative power is responsible for ‘a certain collecting of many things into one’ ( quaedam collectio plurium ad unum), one might assume that nonhuman animals gain cognitive access to universals by gathering together several singulars. It is this very faculty by means of which they ‘cognise one universal from another’, in his view. 5 On the other hand, – and in contrast to most medieval authors – he grants them a cogitative power ( vis cogitativa). On the one hand, he clearly denies intellect and reason to nonhuman animals. But maybe that is exactly the point Bacon wants to make. 3 If read in this way, Bacon’s statement is, indeed, “an unexpected remark,” as Jeremiah Hackett puts it, 4 because it thwarts the expectation of many readers according to which the cognition of universals is an intellectual operation. Similarly, both Peter Sobol and Bernd Roling take Bacon to say that dogs and other animals have cognitive access to universals, such as ‘man’. Köhler claims that Bacon ascribes ‘a form of universal cognition’ (“eine Form von Allgemeinerkenntnis” 2) to nonhuman animals. By and large, this is the answer which many of Bacon’s modern interpreters seem to give. If this is correct, Bacon would indeed hold a very radical position because his view then amounts to saying that the cognition of universals is not dependent on the possession of intellect and reason which is why it can be found in those animals that lack those powers, too. One possible answer is to say that he does. Does Bacon really want to say that nonhuman animals do not only cognise particulars, such as this piece of wood or this man, but universals, such as ‘wood’ or ‘man’, too? Although the wording of this passage is relatively clear, the crucial question now is how this is to be understood. However, in the central part of this passage Bacon adds that ‘they cognise one universal from another, such as man from dog or from wood’. Second, they also manage to differentiate individuals whom they know equally well, such as their owner and his wife. For instance, they distinguish between a man they have met before, say, their owner, and a complete stranger. First, they are able to distinguish between known and unknown individuals, as it were. All Bacon says is that dogs, as well as other nonhuman animals, are capable of making certain distinctions. Neither the beginning nor the end of this passage is particularly startling. And they distinguish individuals of the same species. And they distinguish things they have seen before and of which they have memory, and they cognise one universal from another, such as man from dog or from wood. One passage in particular has attracted the attention of modern interpreters concerned with this topic:īut it is certain that a dog recognises a man it has seen before when it sees him again and monkeys and many other nonhuman animals do this. At least this is the impression one can get from Bacon’s treatise on optics, which is better known as Perspectiva. Yet, if one compares his statements on universal cognition in nonhuman animals to the statements of Roger Bacon, it seems as if Bacon goes even farther. The position of Pseudo-Peter of Spain might strike one as comparatively original, if not even radical, in the sense that it ascribes a rather high capacity for the perception of what he calls ‘elevated intentions’ to animals.
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